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A	  Proposed	  Strategy	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  Develop	  and	  Maintain	  a	  Mainstream	  Capability	  Suite	  (“Warehouse”)	  	  
for	  Automated/Autonomous	  Rendezvous	  and	  Docking	  in	  Low	  Earth	  Orbit	  and	  Beyond1	  
February	  2012	  
	  
Overview	  
The	  ability	  of	  space	  assets	  to	  rendezvous	  and	  dock/capture/berth	  is	  a	  fundamental	  enabler	  for	  numerous	  classes	  
of	  NASA’s	  missions,	  and	  is	  therefore	  an	  essential	  capability	  for	  the	  future	  of	  NASA.	  Mission	  classes	  include:	  ISS	  
crew	   rotation,	   crewed	   exploration	   beyond	   low-­‐Earth-­‐orbit	   (LEO),	   on-­‐orbit	   assembly,	   ISS	   cargo	   supply,	   crewed	  
satellite	  servicing,	   robotic	  satellite	  servicing	  /	  debris	  mitigation,	   robotic	  sample	  return,	  and	  robotic	  small	  body	  
(e.g.	   near-­‐Earth	   object,	   NEO)	   proximity	   operations.	   For	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons	   to	   be	   described,	   NASA	   programs	  
requiring	  Automated/Autonomous	  Rendezvous	  and	  Docking/Capture/Berthing	  (AR&D)	  capabilities	  are	  currently	  
spending	   an	   order-­‐of-­‐magnitude	  more	   than	   necessary	   and	   taking	   twice	   as	   long	   as	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   their	  
AR&D	   capability,	   “reinventing	   the	   wheel”	   for	   each	   program,	   and	   have	   fallen	   behind	   all	   of	   our	   foreign	  
counterparts	  in	  AR&D	  technology	  (especially	  autonomy)	  in	  the	  process.	  To	  ensure	  future	  missions’	  reliability	  and	  
crew	  safety	  (when	  applicable),	  to	  achieve	  the	  noted	  cost	  and	  schedule	  savings	  by	  eliminate	  costs	  of	  continually	  
“reinventing	   the	  wheel”,	   the	  NASA	  AR&D	  Community	   of	   Practice	   (CoP)	   recommends	  NASA	  develop	   an	  AR&D	  
Warehouse,	   detailed	   herein,	   which	   does	   not	   exist	   today.	   The	   term	   “warehouse”	   is	   used	   herein	   to	   refer	   to	   a	  
toolbox	   or	   capability	   suite	   that	   has	   pre-­‐integrated	   selectable	   supply-­‐chain	   hardware	   and	   reusable	   software	  
components	   that	   are	   considered	   ready-­‐to-­‐fly,	   low-­‐risk,	   reliable,	   versatile,	   scalable,	   cost-­‐effective,	   architecture	  
and	  destination	   independent,	   that	   can	  be	   confidently	  utilized	  operationally	  on	  human	   spaceflight	   and	   robotic	  
vehicles	  over	  a	   variety	  of	  mission	  classes	  and	  design	   reference	  missions,	  especially	  beyond	  LEO.	  The	  CoP	  also	  
believes	   that	   it	   is	   imperative	   that	   NASA	   coordinate	   and	   integrate	   all	   current	   and	   proposed	   technology	  
development	  activities	  into	  a	  cohesive	  cross-­‐Agency	  strategy	  to	  produce	  and	  utilize	  this	  AR&D	  warehouse.	  	  
	  
An	  initial	  estimate	  indicates	  that	  if	  NASA	  strategically	  coordinates	  the	  development	  of	  a	  robust	  AR&D	  capability	  
across	   the	  Agency,	   the	  cost	  of	   implementing	  AR&D	  on	  a	   spacecraft	   could	  be	   reduced	   from	  roughly	  $70M	  per	  
mission	  to	  as	  low	  as	  $7M	  per	  mission,	  and	  the	  associated	  development	  time	  could	  be	  reduced	  from	  4	  years	  to	  2	  
years2,	  after	  the	  warehouse	  is	  completely	  developed.	  Table	  1	  shows	  the	  clear	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  to	  the	  Agency	  
in	   term	   of	   costs	   and	   schedules	   for	   various	  missions.	   (The	  methods	   used	   to	   arrive	   at	   the	   Table	   1	   numbers	   is	  
presented	  in	  Appendices	  A	  and	  B.)	  
	  
Table	  1	  -­‐	  Steady-­‐State	  AR&D	  Costs	  Per	  Vehicle	  	  
Vehicle	  Mission	  	   Without	  Integrated	  
Agency	  Strategy	  	  
With	  Integrated	  
Agency	  Strategy	  	  
LEO	  to	  non-­‐ISS	  (e.g.	  satellite	  
servicing,	  on-­‐orbit	  assembly)	  	  
$65.6M‡	  	  
4	  years	  	  
$6.6M‡	  	  
2	  years	  	  
LEO	  to	  ISS	  (dual	  string,	  human	  rated)	  	   $83.4M‡‡	  	  
5	  years	  	  
$20.0M	  to	  $8.4M‡	  	  
2	  years	  	  
Beyond	  LEO	  	   $56.2M‡‡	  	  
4	  years	  	  
$28.8M	  to	  $10.0M‡‡‡	  	  
2	  years	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Authored	  by	  the	  AR&D	  Community	  of	  Practice,	  a	  collaboration	  among	  ARC,	  DFRC,	  GRC,	  GSFC,	  JSC,	  JPL,	  LaRC,	  MSFC,	  and	  
the	  NESC.	  	  
2	  Crain,	  “Business	  Case	  for	  a	  Campaign	  of	  NASA	  AR&D	  Development”,	  EG-­‐DIV-­‐10-­‐022,	  June	  2010.	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Looking	  at	  these	  numbers,	  the	  impact	  is	  enormous,	  particularly	  for	  lower	  cost	  missions.	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  the	  
final	  warehouse	  could	  make	   future	  missions	   in	   the	  $300M	  and	   less	  category	  much	  more	  viable.	  At	  an	  Agency	  
level,	  as	  described	  earlier,	  numerous	  future	  NASA	  missions	  will	  require	  AR&D.	  If	  we	  assume	  6	  new	  vehicles	  going	  
to	  LEO	  (2	  to	  ISS,	  4	  non-­‐ISS),	  and	  2	  going	  beyond	  LEO,	  in	  the	  next	  ten	  years,	  that	  results	  in	  an	  Agency	  savings	  of	  
roughly	  $520M	  and	  16	  development-­‐years	  over	  that	  decade.	  Each	  vehicle	  also	  has	  a	  significant	  risk	  reduction	  in	  
technical	  performance	  as	  time	  progresses.	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  single	  mission	  that	  can	  achieve	  all	  AR&D	  capabilities	  needed	  to	  populate	  the	  AR&D	  warehouse	  and	  
enable	  all	  mission	  classes,	  rather	  a	  campaign	  of	  coordinated	  missions	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  exercise	  and	  develop	  all	  
AR&D-­‐enabling	   capabilities,	   as	   Figure	   1	   shows.	   Agency-­‐level	   direction	   which	   coordinates	   technology	  
development	   over	  multiple	   space-­‐based	   demonstration	  missions,	   each	   leveraging	   on	   the	   prior,	   is	   required	   to	  
achieve	   an	   AR&D	  warehouse	   solution	   for	   the	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   future	   U.S.	   human	   and	   robotic	  missions.	   To	  
achieve	   these	   long-­‐term	   savings,	   some	   minimal	   Agency-­‐level	   investments	   will	   be	   required	   by	   the	   earliest	  
programs	  to	  adopt	  this	  strategy,	  as	  this	  approach	  will	  not	  be	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  solution	  for	  them,	  i.e.	  their	  
cost	  may	   be	   slightly	   higher	   than	   those	   shown	   in	   the	  middle	   column	   of	   Table	   1.	   (One	   quick	   look	   comparison	  
between	  the	  same	  proposal	  with	  and	  without	  using	  the	  Warehouse	  led	  to	  a	  “negligible”	  change	  in	  cost3.	  Since	  
incurred	  delta-­‐costs	  will	  necessarily	  be	  non-­‐zero,	  we	  use	   the	   term	  “minimal”	  when	   referring	   to	   the	  additional	  
costs	   involved,	   especially	   relative	   to	   the	   current	  design	   costs	   shown	   in	   the	  middle	   column	  of	   Table	  1.)	   This	   is	  
precisely	  why	  we	  are	  where	  we	  are	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  history	  of	  point-­‐designs	  and	  their	  obsolescense	  -­‐	  this	  can	  only	  
be	  overcome	  by	  Agency	  leadership	  and	  investment.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  below.	  
	  
	  	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  AR&D	  Characteristics	  and	  Order	  of	  Difficulty	  vs.	  Mission	  Class	  (Notional)	  
(Yellow	  Indicates	  that	  Mission	  Class’	  AR&D	  Systems	  Tend	  to	  Have	  Characteristics	  of	  Foundational	  [Less	  Difficult]	  Missions	  Listed	  in	  the	  Left	  Column,	  	  
Orange	  Indicates	  a	  Tendency	  Toward	  Characteristics	  of	  Advanced	  [More	  Difficult]	  Missions	  Listed	  in	  the	  Right	  Column)	  
	  
Not	   only	   will	   the	   Agency	   achieve	   enormous	   cost	   and	   schedule	   savings,	   but	   future	   missions	   would	   also	   see	  
significant	   risk	   reductions	   in	   technical	   performance	  as	   the	  Warehouse	  develops.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  here	   that	  
NASA	   leadership	   in	  establishing	  an	  AR&D	  warehouse	  will	  also	  benefit	  proposed	  Department	  of	  Defense	   (DoD)	  
missions	  and	  will	  benefit	  the	  commercial	  sector	  as	  well.	  The	  NASA	  AR&D	  CoP	  believes	  the	  AR&D	  Warehouse	  is	  a	  
highly	  desired	  outcome,	  achievable	  in	  the	  next	  five	  to	  ten	  years.	  A	  strong	  commitment	  by	  Agency	  leadership	  to	  a	  
strategic	   Agency	   direction	   based	   on	   an	   evolutionary,	   stair-­‐step	   development,	   through	   a	   campaign	   of	  
coordinated	  ground	  tests	  and	  space-­‐based	  system	  demonstrations	  of	  AR&D	  component	  technologies,	  will	  yield	  
this	  multiple-­‐use	  AR&D	  warehouse	  and	  its	  associated	  benefits.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   Hunt,	   “RE:	   OCFO	   Support	   for	   the	   Autnomous	   Rendezvous,	   Docking,	   and	   Close	   Proximity	   Ops,”	   e-­‐mail	   communication,	  
January	  17,	  2012.	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We	  also	  note	  that	  at	  the	  point	  of	  finalization	  of	  this	  document,	  the	  team	  discovered	  a	  very	  similar	  study	  done	  in	  
2004	  that	  note	  makes	  many	  of	  the	  same	  points4.	  Where	  parallels	  exist,	  reference	  will	  be	  made	  to	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
Before	  proceeding,	  we	  discuss	  possible	  paths	  outside	  of	  NASA.	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  attractive	  to	  purchase	  AR&D	  
capabilities	  abroad,	  if	  foreign	  and/or	  commercial	  systems	  were	  employed	  by	  NASA	  vehicles,	  there	  would	  be	  the	  
risk	  of	  limited	  insight	  into	  their	  designs,	  limits	  on	  our	  vehicles	  as	  dictated	  by	  their	  designs,	  as	  well	  as	  ownership	  
and/or	  technology	  transfer	  issues.	  Reference	  4	  points	  out	  “The	  Europeans	  and	  Russians	  do	  not	  have	  hardware	  or	  
technology	  that	  is	  appropriate	  (too	  heavy,	  high	  mating	  forces,	  etc.)	  to	  use	  or	  adapt	  for	  the	  Exploration	  Initiative”.	  
Even	  partnering	  with	  the	  DoD	  presents	  obstacles	   in	  the	  form	  of	  security	  clearances.	  Thus,	  we	  believe	  a	  NASA-­‐
developed	  warehouse	  is	  critical	  to	  NASA’s	  future.	  
	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  discusses	  the	  problem	  of	  continually	  reinventing	  the	  A&RD	  wheel	  and	  the	  proposed	  
solution	  of	  1)	  implementing	  an	  Agency-­‐integrated	  strategy,	  and	  2)	  developing	  an	  AR&D	  Warehouse.	  The	  risk	  of	  
inaction	  is	  shown	  and	  a	  summary.	  We	  begin	  though,	  with	  clarifying	  remarks	  on	  autonomy	  and	  automation.	  
	  
Autonomy	  and	  Automation	  Defined	  
Before	   proceeding,	   it	   is	   prudent	   to	   clarify	   the	   AR&D	   CoP	   definitions	   of	   autonomy	   and	   automation.	   By	  
“autonomy”	  or	  “autonomous”,	  we	  are	  distinguishing	  between	  ground	  dependency	  and	  onboard	  capability	  for	  a	  
given	  function.	  That	  is,	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  function	  can	  be	  executed	  onboard	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  crew	  and	  
onboard	  software,	  without	  ground	  support;	  a	   fully	  non-­‐autonomous	   function	  requires	  ground	  support	  using	  a	  
combination	  of	  flight	  controllers	  and	  ground	  software.	  By	  “automated”	  or	  “automation”,	  we	  are	  distinguishing	  
between	   computer	   and	   human	   operation.	   A	   fully	   automated	   function	   is	   done	   completely	   by	   computers	  
(onboard	   and/or	   ground);	   a	   fully	   non-­‐automated	   function	   is	   done	   completely	   by	   humans	   (crew	   and/or	   flight	  
controllers).	   Given	   these	   definitions,	   we	   can	   characterize	   the	   split	   between	   onboard	   flight	   computers	  
(autonomous/automated),	   onboard	   crew	   (autonomous/non-­‐automated),	   ground	   computers	   (non-­‐
autonomous/automated),	   and	   humans	   on	   the	   ground	   (non-­‐autonomous/non-­‐automated),	   and	   all	   “shades	   of	  
grey”	  in	  between,	  which	  varies	  greatly	  based	  on	  function.	  Figure	  2	  shows	  a	  notional	  example	  of	  the	  distinction	  
between	  autonomy	  and	  automation.	  
	  
The	  Problem	  –	  Our	  History	  of	  Obsolescense	  
In	  spite	  of	  a	  significant	  track	  record	  of	  successful	  rendezvous	  and	  docking	  missions	  to	  the	  ISS	  involving	  varying	  
degrees	   of	   AR&D	   capability,	   and	   other	   successful	   demonstration	  missions	   of	   limited	   AR&D	   capability,	   a	   U.S.	  
mainstream	  AR&D	  technology	  base	  for	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  missions	  does	  not	  exist.	  (“None	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  an	  
automated	   rendezvous	   and	   docking	   system	   currently	   exist	   in	   flight-­‐ready	   systems	   in	   the	   United	   States.”4)	   To	  
date,	   all	   U.S.	   programs	   have	   generated	   point-­‐designs	   with	   limited	   application.	   (“Present	   technology	   for	  
rendezvous	  is	  mission	  unique,	  and	  requires	  extensive	  human	  in	  the	  loop	  activity	  for	  flight	  operations	  and	  ground	  
control,	   resulting	   in	   cost	   and	   schedule	   impacts.”4)	   For	   example,	   full	   autonomy	   and	   automation	   has	   not	   been	  
required	  for	  LEO	  rendezvous	  and	  docking	  missions	  as	  yet,	  because	  these	  missions	  take	  advantage	  of	  ground	  and	  
space-­‐based	  assets	  (“Virtually	  all	  rendezvous’	  and	  dockings	  (R&D)	  performed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  date	  have	  
utilized	  crew-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  and	  ground	  controller	  assistance….	  The	  United	  States	  has	  not	  yet	  performed	  an	  AR&D	  
mission.”4)	   -­‐	   in	  effect,	  missions	   implement	  varying	  degrees	  of	  autonomy	  and	  automation	   that	  are	   tailored	   for	  
their	   purposes.	   Thus,	   new	   missions	   requiring	   AR&D	   capabilities	   continue	   to	   incur	   significant	   non-­‐recurring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Winkler,	   Roberts	   and	   Vaught,	   “Autonomous	   Rendezvous	   and	   Docking	   White	   Paper	   and	   Final	   Report”,	   Capability	  
Requirement	  Analysis	  and	  Integration	  (CRAI)	  Independent	  Assessment	  Team,	  June	  2004.	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engineering	  (NRE)	  and	  development	  costs	  related	  to	  AR&D	  component	  sensors	  and	  integrated	  systems,	  and	  the	  
systems	  developed	  are	  point	  designs	  -­‐	  even	  worse,	  designs	  that	  become	  obsolete	  after	  each	  mission	  is	  flown.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Notional	  Example	  Levels	  of	  Autonomy	  and	  Automation	  for	  Shuttle	  Final	  Docking	  Approach,	  for	  Both	  
Translational	  and	  Attitude	  Control	  
	  
For	   example,	   for	   the	   past	   three	   decades	   the	   Space	   Shuttle	   exclusively	   provided	   American	   operational	  
rendezvous	  and	  docking	  capability.	  While	  Space	  Shuttle	  rendezvous	  activities	  have	  been	  100%	  successful,	  they	  
have	   been	   limited	   to	   LEO	   operations	   and	   heavily	   utilized	   ground	   operators	   and	   the	   flight	   crew	   to	   increase	  
mission	  success	  probability	  and	  robustness	  to	  failures.	  In	  recent	  years,	  several	  AR&D	  technology	  demonstrators	  
such	   as	   Orbital	   Express	   and	   XSS-­‐11	   have	   flown	   successful	   or	   partially	   successful	   Rendezvous,	   Proximity	  
Operations,	   and	   Docking	   (RPOD)	   missions	   with	   intentionally	   limited	   human	   involvement	   from	   ground	  
controllers.	  These	  missions	  were	  also	   intentionally	   limited	   in	  scope	  and	  capability,	  and	  had	  no	  clear	   long-­‐term	  
impact	  as	  they	  were	  not	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  coordinated	  strategy.	  In	  fact,	  much	  of	  the	  hardware	  demonstrated	  on	  
these	   missions	   is	   no	   longer	   available	   to	   support	   future	   flights.	   Operational	   ISS	   transport	   and	   re-­‐supply	   is	  
currently	  provided	  by	  AR&D	  systems	   in	   the	   form	  of	  ATV,	  HTV,	  and	  Progress,	  by	   the	  Europeans,	   Japanese,	  and	  
Russians	   respectively,	   and	   in	   the	   future	   by	   the	   U.S.	   through	   the	   Orion/MPCV	   spacecraft	   and/or	   commercial	  
vendors.	  All	  these	  systems	  are	  necessarily	  optimized	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  LEO	  infrastructure,	  such	  as	  GPS	  and	  
ready-­‐access	   to	   ground	   controllers,	   and	   are	   therefore	   not	   extensible	   to	   applications	   beyond	   LEO	   without	  
significant	  NRE.	  	  
	  
The	   capabilities	   developed	   for	   each	   vehicle	   and	   mission	   simply	   do	   not	   outlive	   their	   projects.	   They	   become	  
obsolete	  and	  are	  of	  limited	  or	  no	  use	  to	  future	  programs,	  so	  new	  NASA	  projects	  are	  continually	  reinventing	  the	  
wheel	   of	  AR&D.	   The	  primary	   reason	   for	   this	   “history	  of	  obsolescense”	   is	   a	   lack	  of	   an	   integrated	  Agency-­‐wide	  
AR&D	   technology	   development	   strategy	   that	   drives	   programs	   to	   long-­‐term	   Agency-­‐wide	   solutions	   versus	  
program	   point	   designs,	   and	   funding	   the	   additional	  minimal	   resources	   to	   the	   programs	   that	   this	   takes	   in	   the	  
short-­‐term.	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The	  Solution,	  Part	  1	  –	  Integrated	  Agency	  AR&D	  Strategy	  
Broad	  Agency	   support	  and	   funding	   for	  an	  evolutionary,	   stair-­‐step	  development	   through	  a	   campaign	  of	   space-­‐
based	   system	   demonstrations	   of	   an	   AR&D	   capability	   suite	   that	   supports	   the	   spectrum	   of	   Agency	   exploration	  
missions	   is	   required.	   As	   capabilities	   continue	   to	   be	   developed,	   it	   may	   not	   always	   be	   in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	  
individual	  Programs	  to	  help	  advance	  these	  capabilities,	  especially	   in	  terms	  of	  maintaining	  the	  versatility	  of	  the	  
system.	   If	  upcoming	  missions	   simply	   tailor	   recent	   LEO	  demonstration	   systems	   to	   fit	   their	   specific	  needs,	   their	  
contribution	  to	  future	  planned	  missions	  will	  be	  minimal,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  Agency	  will	  also	  have	  
to	  commit	  to	  continual	  reassessment	  of	  this	  AR&D	  strategy,	  making	  adjustments	  as	  needed.	  The	  Agency	  will	  also	  
have	  to	  actively	  coordinate	  AR&D	  efforst	  at	  various	  centers,	  because,	  as	  noted	   in	  Reference	  3,	  “An	   integrated	  
program	   to	   develop	   and	   demonstrate	   AR&D	   hardware	   and	   software	   for	   the	   Exploration	   Initiative	   does	   not	  
currently	  exist…An	  AR&D	  Program	  formulation	  plan	  needs	  to	  be	  developed…	  The	  lack	  of	  top-­‐level	  requirements,	  
guidelines,	  ground-­‐rules,	  expectations	  and	  design	  reference	  missions	  is	  a	  clear	  impediment	  to	  the	  orderly	  pursuit	  
of	  preliminary	  systems	  designs”	  across	  centers.	  The	  OCE	  and	  NESC	  will	  support	  all	  continued	  efforts	  to	  ensure	  
continual	  Agency	  support	  and	  manage	  overall	  integrated	  Agency	  AR&D	  success.	  	  
	  
The	  Solution,	  Part	  2	  -­‐	  The	  Warehouse	  /	  Toolbox	  /	  Library	  Concept	  
Before	  proceeding,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   idea	  of	   an	  AR&D	  warehouse	   is	   not	  one	  of	   standardizing	  AR&D.	  
Rather,	  the	  concept	  is	  a	  library	  or	  toolbox	  of	  reusuable	  AR&D	  GN&C	  algorithms,	  coupled	  with	  reusuable	  mission	  
manager	  algorithms	  and	  supply-­‐chain	  hardware	  components,	  all	   integrated	  with	  standardized	   interfaces.	  Only	  
the	   interfaces	   are	   standardized.	   Although	   it	   would	   be	   highly	   desired,	   it	   is	   impractical	   to	   design	   a	   “universal”	  
AR&D	  warehouse	  that	  meets	  100	  percent	  of	   the	  needs	  for	  every	  mission.	  Therefore,	   the	  goal	   is	   to	  provide	  an	  
AR&D	   toolbox	  with	   approximately	   80	   percent	   of	   the	   capability	   needed	   for	   any	  mission	   and	   flexible	   interface	  
standards	   that	   allow	   each	  mission	   to	   tailor	   the	   remaining	   20	   percent	   of	   their	   flight	   design	   based	   on	   unique	  
mission	  needs.	  	  
	  
The	  warehouse	  achieves	  the	  80	  percent	  capability	  by	  first	  compiling	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  AR&D	  software	  and	  
algorithm	   libraries,	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   3,	  which	   represent	   the	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   from	  NASA	   organizations.	   The	  
software	   and	   algorithm	   libraries	   are	   accompanied	   by	   AR&D	   flight	   processors	   and	   emulators,	  
docking/berthing/capture	  system	  emulators,	  and	   interface	  control	  documents	   (ICDs).	   Integrated	  together	  with	  
standardized	   interfaces	   and	   supply-­‐chain	   hardware,	   this	   AR&D	   warehouse	   provides	   the	   ability	   to	   construct	  
cohesive	  AR&D	  flight	  system	  configurations,	  or	   instantiations,	  very	  rapidly,	  for	  all	  of	  NASA’s	  future	  robotic	  and	  
human	  missions	  requiring	  AR&D.	  	  
	  
Each	   element	   of	   the	   AR&D	   warehouse	   is	   evolvable	   allowing	   advances	   in	   sensor	   technology,	   computer	  
technology,	  and	  algorithms	  to	  be	  integrated	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  difficulty.	  Since	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  effort	  in	  an	  
AR&D	   mission	   is	   solving	   the	   complex	   systems	   integration	   challenges,	   the	   80	   percent	   off-­‐the-­‐shelf	   solution	  
delivered	  by	  the	  warehouse	  greatly	  reduces	  the	  NRE	  costs	  for	  each	  mission	  compared	  to	  business-­‐as-­‐usual.	  
	  
Note	  that	  no	  project	  is	  forced	  to	  use	  any	  of	  the	  warehouse.	  When	  a	  new	  mission	  sets	  out	  to	  develop	  its	  AR&D	  
system,	  or	  a	  mission	  concept	  team	  sets	  out	  to	  quickly	  model	  its	  AR&D	  system,	  those	  involved	  simply	  pull	  what	  
they	   want	   from	   the	   warehouse	   “toolbox”	   or	   “library”.	   If	   they	   choose,	   they	   can	   use	   nothing	   from	   the	   AR&D	  
warehouse,	  and	  start	  out	  with	  less	  than	  10%	  of	  their	  design.	  Or	  if	  they	  pull	  one	  of	  each	  category	  of	  items	  in	  the	  
toolbox,	  they	  could	  end	  up	  with	  as	  much	  of	  80%	  of	  their	  design.	  After	  their	  design	  is	  complete,	  they	  place	  any	  
newly	  developed	  items	  back	  into	  the	  warehouse	  for	  future	  missions’	  use.	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Figure	  3	  –	  AR&D	  Mainstream	  Capability	  Suite	  (“Warehouse”)	  
	  
The	  warehouse	  would	  need	  to	  have	  two	  categories	  assigned	  to	  each	  item	  within.	  The	  first	  would	  be	  categories	  
similar	  to	  TRLs	  to	  distinguish	  developmental	  items	  at	  one	  extreme	  versus	  items	  with	  flight	  heritage	  at	  the	  other.	  
The	  second	  would	  be	  to	  distinguish	  open	  source	  items	  versus	  other	  classifications.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  maximize	  the	  
open-­‐source	  nature	  of	   the	   items	   in	   the	  warehouse.	  At	  a	  minimum,	   items	   in	   the	  warehouse	  shall	  meet	  “open-­‐
interface”	  standards	  –	  even	  if	  an	  item	  is	  a	  “black	  box”	  because	  of	  contractual,	  proprietary,	  or	  other	  restrictions,	  
other	  elements	  of	  the	  warehouse	  will	  be	  able	  to	  utilize	  that	   item,	  for	  any	  program	  that	  wishes	  to	  use	  such	  an	  
item.	  This	  will	  enable	  sharing	  of	  items	  across	  NASA	  and	  DoD	  and	  our	  industry	  partners.	  Figure	  4	  shows	  how	  this	  
might	   be	   done.	   The	   AR&D	   CoP	   has	   received	   initial	   interested	   from	   AFRL,	   and	   believes	   DARPA	   will	   also	   be	  
interested	   in	   working	   with	   NASA	   on	   the	   AR&D	  Warehouse	   concept.	   In	   fact,	   a	   similar	   concept	   to	   the	   AR&D	  
warehouse	   development	   is	   already	   underway	   at	   DARPA’s	   Tactical	   Technology	   Office	   within	   the	   System	   F6	  
project5.	  	  
	  
The	  AR&D	  CoP	  will	  also	  provide	  support	  via	  its	  network	  of	  experts	  to	  projects	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  utilizing,	  and	  later	  
contribiting	  to,	  the	  warehouse.	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  clarify	   that	  AR&D	   is	  not	  a	   system	  and	  cannot	  be	  purchased	  off	   the	   shelf.	  Rather,	  AR&D	   is	  a	  
distributed	  capability	  that	  requires	  many	  vehicle	  subsystems	  to	  operate	  in	  concert,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5.	  (“AR&D	  
is	   a	   required	   long-­‐lead	   item	  …	  with	  a	   significant	   interplay	  with	   other	   vehicle	   systems.	   It	  must	   be	   treated	  as	   a	  
systems	  problem.”	  4)	  
	  
Thus,	   AR&D	   leverages	   the	   complete	   vehicle	   capability	   through	   the	   systems	   engineering	   and	   integration	   of	  
multiple	  subsystems.	  For	  this	  reason,	  our	  proposed	  strategy	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  development	  of	  a	  single	  complete	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/System_F6.aspx.	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AR&D	  package	  capable	  of	  being	  wired	  into	  a	  spacecraft	  which	  supports	  all	  mission	  types	  in	  Figure	  1	  (“AR&D-­‐in-­‐a-­‐
box”).	   Instead	  our	  strategy	  focuses	  on	  development	  of	  an	  AR&D	  capability	  suite,	  which	  primarily	   involves	  four	  
specific	   subsystems,	   that	   can	   enable	   AR&D	   and	   its	   required	   integration	   for	   all	   these	   missions.	   These	   four	  
subsystems	  are	   those	  which	  are	  most	   impacted	  by	  adding	  an	  AR&D	  requirement	   to	  a	  vehicle:	  GN&C,	  Mission	  
Manager,	  Sensors,	  and	  of	  course	  the	  Docking	  System	  which	  is	  not	  required	  at	  all	  without	  AR&D.	  (Note	  that	  all	  
other	  subsytems,	  e.g.	  propulsion,	  C&DH,	  etc.,	  would	  be	  part	  of	  any	  vehicle,	  even	  those	  that	  do	  not	  rendezvous.)	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4	  –	  An	  Illustration	  of	  How	  the	  AR&D	  Warehouse	  Could	  Use	  Both	  Open-­‐Source	  and	  Closed-­‐Source	  Elements	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Figure	  5	  -­‐	  AR&D	  is	  a	  Really	  an	  Integration	  of	  Many	  Subsystems;	  Four	  are	  AR&D-­‐Specific	  (Shown	  in	  Green)	  	  
	  
The	   AR&D	   capability	   suite	   would	   be	   populated	   with	   various	   solutions	   for	   each	   of	   these	   four	   areas,	   and	   all	  
solutions	   would	   have	   standardized	   interfaces	   (e.g.	   the	   recently	   agreed-­‐to	   “International	   Docking	   System	  
Standard”6).	  Then,	  each	  mission	  would	  then	  pick-­‐and-­‐choose	  which	  solutions	  in	  the	  AR&D	  suite	  are	  most	  useful	  
for	  implementing	  their	  design.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  four	  subsystems	  that	  are	  most	  impacted	  for	  any	  AR&D	  mission:	  
	  
1) Relative	   Navigation	   Sensors	   and	   Integrated	   Communications	   –	   During	   the	   course	   of	   RPOD,	   varying	  
accuracies	   of	   bearing,	   range,	   and	   relative	   attitude	   are	   needed	   for	   AR&D.	   Current	   commercial	  
implementations	   for	   optical,	   laser,	   and	   RF	   systems	   (and	   combinations	   of	   these)	   are	  mid-­‐TRL	   (Technology	  
Readiness	   Level)	   and	   require	   flight	   experience	   to	   gain	   reliability	   and	   operational	   confidence.	   Moreover,	  
integrated	  communication	  capability	  (at	  mid-­‐field	  to	  near-­‐field	  range)	  greatly	  enhances	  the	  responsiveness	  
and	  robustness	  of	  the	  AR&D	  GN&C	  system,	  along	  with	  its	  portability.	  
	  
2) Robust	  AR&D	  GN&C	  &	  Real-­‐Time	  Flight	  Software	  (FSW)	  –	  Space	  Shuttle,	  Orbital	  Express,	  XSS-­‐11,	  and	  other	  
development	  efforts	  have	  raised	  the	  maturity	  of	  AR&D	  GN&C	  algorithms	  to	  a	  very	  high	  level	  for	  these	  point	  
designs.	  However,	   to	  develop	  and	   refine	   these	  point	  design	  algorithms	   into	  a	   robust	  AR&D	  GN&C	  system	  
capability,	   integrated	  with	  the	  high-­‐level	  Mission/System	  Managers	   (item	  4	  below),	  and	   implemented	   into	  
realtime	  FSW	  is	  an	  enormous	  challenge.	  A	  best-­‐practices	  based	  implementation	  of	  an	  AR&D	  GN&C	  system	  
into	  real-­‐time	  FSW	  operating	  systems	  does	  not	  exist.	  
	  
3) Docking/Capture	  Mechanisms/Interfaces	   –	  NASA	   is	   planning	   for	   the	   imminent	   construction	  of	   a	   new	   low-­‐
impact	   docking	   mechanism	   built	   to	   an	   international	   standard	   for	   human	   spaceflight	   missions	   to	   ISS.	   A	  
smaller	   common	   docking	   system	   for	   robotic	   spacecraft	   is	   also	   needed	   to	   enable	   cost-­‐efficient	   robotic	  
spacecraft	  AR&D.	  Assembly	  of	  the	   large	  vehicles	  and	  stages	  used	  for	  beyond	  LEO	  exploration	  missions	  will	  
require	   new	   mechanisms	   with	   new	   capture	   envelopes	   beyond	   any	   docking	   system	   currently	   used	   or	   in	  
development.	   Berthing	   methods	   may	   also	   be	   utilized	   when	   warranted	   by	   mission	   requirements.	  
Furthermore,	   for	   satellite	   servicing/rescue,	   development	   and	   testing	   is	   needed	   for	   the	   application	   of	  
autonomous	  robotic	  capture	  of	  non-­‐cooperative	  target	  vehicles	   in	  which	  the	  target	  does	  not	  have	  capture	  
aids	  such	  as	  grapple	  fixtures.	  AR&D	  capability	  must	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  capture	  envelopes	  of	  all	  of	  these	  
systems.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “International	  Docking	  System	  Standard	  (IDSS),	  Interface	  Definitions	  Document	  (IDD)”,	  September	  2010.	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4) Mission/System	  Managers	  for	  Autonomy/Automation	  –	  A	  scalable	  spacecraft	  software	  executive	  that	  can	  be	  
tailored	  for	  various	  mission	  applications	  and	  various	  levels	  of	  autonomy	  and	  automation,	  as	  enabled	  by	  the	  
robust	  AR&D	  GN&C	  system	  (item	  2	  above),	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  safety	  and	  operational	  confidence	  in	  AR&D	  
software	   execution.	   A	   scalable	   and	   evolvable	   executive	   architecture	   will	   prevent	   each	   mission	   from	  
reinventing	   this	   critical	  piece	  of	   the	  AR&D	  software.	  Numerous	   spacecraft	   software	  executives	  have	  been	  
developed,	   but	   the	   necessary	   piece	   that	   is	  missing	   is	   an	   Agency-­‐wide	   open	   interface	   standard	  which	  will	  
minimize	  the	  costs	  of	  such	  architectures.	  Creation	  of	  such	  a	  standard	   is	  also	  critical	  to	  ensure	  an	  ability	  of	  
these	  architectures	  to	  leverage	  lessons	  learned	  and	  to	  evolve	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  autonomy/automation	  over	  
time	  as	  trust	  increases	  gradually	  in	  these	  capabilities.	  This	  evolutionary	  trait	  is	  especially	  critical	  to	  the	  trust	  
of,	  and	  therefore	  success	  of,	  AR&D	  on	  crewed	  vehicles.	  Advances	  in	  fault	  management	  techniques	  must	  also	  
be	   made	   in	   parallel.	   Reference	   3	   states	   “Autonomous	   Flight	   Manager	   software	   is	   essential	   for	   all	  
autonomous	  vehicle	  subsystems,	   including	  AR&D,	  and	  may	  well	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  most	  difficult	  development	  
task	  for	  the	  Exploration	  Initiative.”	  
	  
None	  of	  these	  subsystems	  are	  low	  TRL	  by	  themselves;	  the	  immaturity	  is	  in	  the	  integration.	  Some	  are	  not	  mature	  
enough	   to	  be	  considered	   for	   further	  development	  and	   refinement	   into	  an	  AR&D	  warehouse.	  This	  will	   require	  
both	   ground	   testing	   and	   on-­‐orbit	   demonstrations,	   as	   well	   as	   incorporation	   of	   lessons	   learned	   through	  
integration	  with	  other	   subsystems	  on	   a	   variety	  of	   spacecraft	   before	   they	   can	   all	   be	   considered	  part	   of	   a	  U.S.	  
AR&D	  warehouse.	  	  
	  
The	  AR&D	  CoP	  believes	  that	  once	  an	  AR&D	  warehouse	  is	  established,	  its	  application	  to	  future	  Programs	  will	  save	  
significant	  NRE	  costs,	  avoid	  considerable	  schedule	  delays,	  and	  significantly	  reduce	  technical	  risk.	  The	  Programs	  
could	  tailor	  (and	  even	  enhance)	  these	  capabilities	  with	  minimal	  investments.	  In	  the	  long	  term,	  this	  represents	  a	  
substantial	  savings	  in	  cost,	  schedule,	  and	  technical	  risk	  to	  each	  Program	  and	  subsequently	  to	  the	  Agency	  overall.	  
This	   is	   especially	   important	   from	   an	   Agency	   perspective	   as	   the	   savings	   multiply	   by	   the	   number	   of	   AR&D	  
missions.	  Development	  of	  a	  U.S.	  AR&D	  warehouse	  consists	  of	  three	  elements:	  	  
	  
1) Initial	   maturation	   of	   the	   four	   subsystem	   technologies	   (relative	   navigation	   sensors	   and	   integrated	  
communication,	   robust	   AR&D	  GN&C	  &	   real-­‐time	   FSW,	   docking/capture	  mechanisms,	   and	  mission/system	  
managers).	   This	   can	   be	   addressed	   in	   relatively	   short	   order	   with	   the	   judicious	   coordination	   of	   ongoing	  
Program	   efforts	   and	   new	   funding.	   Leveraging	   the	   RPOD	   accomplishments	   of	   previous	   Programs,	   heritage	  
GN&C	  algorithms,	   and	   software	  will	   be	  utilized	   to	  minimize	  development	   costs.	   Existing	  mission	  manager	  
software	  will	  be	  used	   initially	  as	  a	  baseline	   to	  create	  a	   flexible	  and	  configurable	   system	  to	   support	   future	  
vehicle	  architectures.	  NASA	  has	  already	   invested	   significant	   resources	   toward	   the	  NRE	  development	   costs	  
for	   pertinent	   navigation	   sensors	   required	   for	   AR&D.	   This	   first	   element	   involves	   both	   ground	   and	   flight	  
testing,	  provides	  NASA	  with	  hands-­‐on	  experience,	  establishes	  the	  architecture	  for	  the	  capability	  suite,	  and	  
lays	  the	  groundwork	  for	  commercial	  application.	  
	  
2) Achieve	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  integration	  and	  interplay	  of	  AR&D	  with	  various	  subsystems,	  while	  meeting	  
vehicle	  and	  mission	  requirements	  and	  constraints.	  This	  is	  our	  most	  significant	  challenge.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  
the	  AR&D	  development	  effort	  involves	  recognizing	  and	  dealing	  with	  contingencies	  and	  unexpected	  behavior	  
from	   subsystem	   interaction	   and	   off-­‐nominal	   conditions.	   So,	   in	   addition	   to	   architecting	   the	   AR&D	   GN&C	  
system	  to	  maximize	  robustness	  (through	  well-­‐designed	  FDIR	  and	  contingency	  responses)	  and	  minimize	  such	  
subsystem	   interaction/dependencies	   (i.e.,	   keeping	   clean	   interfaces	   by	   design),	   we	   must	   accumulate	  
operational	  experience,	  confidence,	  and	  history	  with	  these	  systems	  and	  capabilities	  through	  ground	  testing	  
as	  well	   as	  multiple	   space-­‐based	   system	   demonstrations	   to	   lower	   the	   risk	   for	   each	  mission.	   The	   focus	   for	  
AR&D	   technology	   development	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   two	   steps.	   First,	   re-­‐use,	   extend,	   and	   update	   current	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mature	  capabilities.	  Second,	  fill	  and	  enhance	  the	  remaining	  technology	  gaps,	  such	  as	  enhancing	  autonomy	  
through	  systematic	  fail-­‐operational	  approaches,	  enhance	  mission	  manager	  re-­‐planning	  and	  re-­‐configuration	  
response	  capabilities,	  incorporation	  of	  robust	  AR&D	  GN&C	  algorithms	  into	  real-­‐time	  FSW,	  and	  extension	  of	  
these	  algorithms	  to	  support	  missions	  beyond	  LEO.	  	  
	  
3) Development	  of	   supply	   chains	   for	  AR&D	  hardware.	  A	   very	   large	  portion	  of	   the	   cost	   reductions	   estimated	  
herein	  is	  due	  to	  use	  of	  hardware	  made	  available	  through	  a	  stable	  supply	  chain.	  As	  mentioned,	  our	  history	  is	  
one	   of	   AR&D	   hardware	   developed	   for	   single-­‐use	   applications.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   standardizing	   docking	  
mechanisms	   for	   larger	  spacecraft,	   the	  Agency	   is	  already	  moving	   forward	  with	  changing	  this	  paradigm.	  We	  
have	  many	  more	  opportunities	  however	  to	  ensure	  that	  hardware	  is	  available	  for	  multiple	  uses.	  For	  example,	  
three	  separate	  flash	  LIDAR	  experiments	  have	  flown	  on	  the	  Space	  Shuttle	  in	  recent	  years.	  NASA	  should	  take	  
steps	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  three	  continue	  in	  development	  and	  remain	  available	  for	  selection	  by	  programs,	  “off-­‐
the-­‐shelf”,	  as	  all	   three	  have	  their	  applications	  depending	  on	  program	  requirements.	  But	  none	  will	  ever	  be	  
selected	  if	  the	  supply	  is	  not	  there.	  The	  classes	  of	  sensors	  of	  use	  to	  AR&D	  can	  be	  generally	  grouped	  according	  
to:	  
	  
a. Long	   range	   RF	   devices:	   At	   distances	   of	   1-­‐1,000+	   km	  RF	   signals	   between	   AR&D	   spacecraft	   are	  
used	  to	  support	  rendezvous	  maneuvers	  with	  timely	  state	  updates.	  
b. Long	  range	  optical	  devices:	  At	  distances	  of	  1-­‐1,000+	  km	  optical	  bearing	  measurements	  may	  be	  
accumulated	  in	  time	  to	  support	  rendezvous	  maneuvers.	  
c. Medium	  range	  optical	  and	  laser	  devices:	  At	  distances	  in	  the	  transition	  between	  rendezvous	  and	  
proximity	  operations	  (1-­‐30	  km)	  optical	  and	  laser	  devices	  can	  be	  used	  to	  directly	  measure	  relative	  
translational	  states.	  
d. Short	  range	  optical	  and	  laser	  devices:	  At	  distances	  appropriate	  for	  proximity	  operations	  (<	  5	  km	  
to	   dock)	   optical	   and	   laser	   devices	   may	   provide	   both	   translation	   and	   orientation	   state	  
information	  
	  
Risk	  of	  Inaction	  
Thus	   far,	  we	  have	  attempted	  to	  establish	   these	   four	   items:	  1)	   there	   is	  no	  current	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  versatile	  AR&D	  
capability,	  2)	  technology	  components	  (such	  as	  sensors)	  developed	  for	  previous	  missions	  often	  no	  longer	  exist	  in	  
a	  production	  capacity	  and/or	  they	  were	  most	   likely	  designed	  with	  specific	  missions	   in	  mind	  and	  would	  require	  
extensive	   redesign,	   3)	   foreign	   and	   commercial	   systems	   are	   not	   viable	   for	   this	   same	   reason,	   in	   addition	   to	  
complications	  from	  limited	  insight	  in	  their	  designs	  and	  limits	  on	  our	  vehicles	  as	  dictated	  by	  their	  designs,	  and	  4)	  
AR&D’s	  level	  of	  dependency	  on	  other	  systems.	  Assuming	  there	  is	  agreement	  on	  these	  four	  items,	  then,	  without	  
Agency-­‐level	  direction,	  coordination,	  commitment,	  and	  investments	  to	  get	  an	  AR&D	  warehouse,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  
to	   assume	   that	   new	   Programs	   requiring	   an	   AR&D	   capability	   must	   continue	   to	   develop	   their	   own	   AR&D	  
components,	  “reinventing	  the	  wheel”	  for	  each	  mission,	  developing	  their	  own	  tailored/custom,	  sufficient	  AR&D	  
systems.	   They	  will	   continue	   to	   be	  burdened	  with	   the	   associated	   significant	  NRE,	   schedule,	   and	   technical	   risk.	  
NASA	   will	   perpetuate	   the	   history	   of	   obsolescence	   and	   prevent	   the	  maturation	   of	   an	   Agency	   capability	   suite	  
which	  would	  reduce	  these	  risks	  for	  future	  Programs.	  The	  penalty	  of	  not	  establishing	  an	  Agency-­‐level	  coordinated	  
strategy	  now	  is	  significant	  long	  term	  additional	  cost,	   increased	  development	  time,	  and	  increased	  risk	  for	  future	  
Projects.	  Additionally,	  the	  Agency	  will	  miss	  an	  opportunity	  to	  address	  our	  needs,	  influence	  the	  commercial	  sector,	  
and	  will	  fall	  ever	  further	  behind	  our	  foreign	  counterparts.	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Strategy	  Implementation	  Relative	  to	  Orion/MPCV	  
Arguing	   the	   implementation	   of	   this	   strategy	   through	   various	   NASA	   Programs	   is	   not	   a	   purpose	   of	   this	   white	  
paper.	  However,	  the	  AR&D	  CoP	  has	  been	  asked	  to	  specifically	  address	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  Orion	  in	  the	  Agency	  
implementation.	   If	   the	   Agency	   directed	  Orion	   (or	   any	   other	   current	   Program)	   to	   become	   part	   of	   this	   Agency	  
strategy,	   Orion	   could	   become	   one	   of	   the	   viable	   and	   crucial	   first	   steps	   in	   the	   overall	   evolutionary,	   stair-­‐step	  
development	  effort.	  As	  an	  example,	  to	   implement	  this	  utilizing	  an	  Orion	  that	  will	  go	  to	  ISS,	  minimal	  additional	  
Agency-­‐level	   investments	   would	   be	   required	   and	   additional	   strategic	   AR&D	   requirements	   would	   need	   to	   be	  
levied	  on	  Orion	  and	  ISS.	  Without	  such	  Agency	  level	  redirection,	  Orion	  will	  surely	  optimize	  its	  AR&D	  subsystems	  
for	  their	  mission	  specific	  LEO	  operations	  (e.g.	  taking	  advantage	  of	  GPS,	  TDRSS,	  and	  ground	  support	  that	  would	  
not	  be	  available	  for	  other	  mission	  classes).	  As	  Figure	  1	  shows,	  an	  Orion	  design	  optimized	  for	  an	  ISS	  mission	  will	  
not	   fully	  provide	  all	  AR&D	  needs	   for	   the	  NASA	  portfolio	  of	  missions	  over	   the	  next	  10-­‐15	  years.	  However,	  with	  
Agency	   investments	   and	   proper	   re-­‐direction,	   NASA	   can	   utilize	   Orion	   in	  mutually	   developing	   a	   system	   that	   is	  
extensible	   to	  human	  and	   robotic	  missions	  beyond	  LEO	  and	  build	  a	  more	  complete	  solution	  which	   is	   reusable.	  
This	  benefit	  would	  be	  gained	  even	  if	  Orion	  does	  not	  go	  to	  ISS,	  and	  even	  if	  we	  chose	  a	  different	  vehicle	  for	  our	  
example.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  coupled	  with	  additional	  investments	  in	  other	  Programs,	  Orion’s	  AR&D	  system	  would	  
satisfy	  the	  Agency’s	  first-­‐step	  objectives,	  and	  ensure	  that	  Orion	  would	  complement	  the	  overall	  strategic	  path	  to	  
an	  AR&D	  warehouse	  for	  the	  Agency.	  	  
	  
Progress	  Thus	  Far	  and	  Immediate	  Next	  Steps	  
Significant	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  already	  in	  achieving	  agreement	  with	  the	  strategy	  outlined	  herein.	  First,	  the	  
AR&D	   Community	   of	   Practice	   has	   led	   AR&D	   practitioners	   at	   eight	   NASA	   centers	   and	   the	   NESC	   to	   come	   to	  
agreement	   on	   this	   strategy.	   This	   paper	   has	   been	   presented	   and	   endorsed	   and/or	   agreed	   to	   by	   the	   Agency’s	  
Flight	   Sciences	   Steering	   Committee,	   the	   Agency	   Chief	   Engineer,	   the	   GNC	   Technical	   Discipline	   Team,	   and	   the	  
NESC	  Review	  Board.	  The	  Office	  of	  Chief	  Technologist	  adopted	  the	  bulk	  of	   its	  TA4	  Roadmap	  (insert	   reference!)	  
from	  early	  drafts	  of	  this	  whitepaper,	  and	  drafted	  its	  2010	  Broad	  Area	  Announcement	  call	   in	  the	  area	  of	  AR&D	  
also	   from	   early	   drafts	   of	   this	   document.	   Early	   in	   CY2012,	   the	   CoP	   will	   incorporate	   any	   public	   and	   industry	  
feedback	   that	  OCT	   received	   from	   its	   roadmaps,	  and	   then	  will	   release	   this	   full	  whitepaper	   to	   the	  DoD	  and	   the	  
public	  via	  publication	  and	  solitic	  additional	  feedback	  and	  support.	  
	  
While	  implementation	  details	  are	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  whitepaper,	  once	  fully	  adopted,	  the	  CoP	  will	  formulate	  
recommendations	  for	  implementation	  if	  requested.	  In	  parallel,	  the	  initial	  development	  of	  the	  warehouse	  can	  go	  
forward,	  and	  it	  has.	  The	  warehouse	  concept	  has	  already	  received	  $225k	  in	  institutional	  funds	  from	  the	  centers	  
to	   begin	   building	   the	   warehouse	   and	   the	   standardized	   interfaces	   necessary.	   An	   initial	   demonstration	   of	   the	  
warehouse	  was	  performed	   in	   September	  2011.	   The	  CoP	  hopes	   to	   acquire	   additional	   funding	   to	   complete	   the	  
initial	  development	  of	  the	  warehouse	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  it,	  especially	   its	  algorithm	  modularity	  and	  capability	  
to	  run	  in	  multiple	  environments	  and	  testbeds	  in	  FY2012.	  	  
	  
The	   CoP	  will	   also	   be	   looking	   for	   a	   low	   cost	   flight	   opportunity.	  Once	   the	  warehouse	   is	   successfully	   used	   for	   a	  
flight,	   the	   cost	   savings	   will	   be	   calculated	   and	   used	   to	   refine	   the	   projected	   costs	   already	   mentioned	   in	   this	  
whitepaper.	  
	  
Summary	  
The	  AR&D	  CoP	  recommends	  that	  the	  Agency	  make	  the	  necessary	  commitments	  and	  investments	  to	  implement	  a	  
cohesive	   cross-­‐Agency	   strategic	   direction	   for	   AR&D,	   that	   is	   based	   on	   evolutionary	   stair-­‐step	   development	  
through	   a	   campaign	   of	   coordinated	   ground	   tests	   and	   space-­‐based	   system	   demonstrations,	   to	   achieve	   a	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mainstream	  AR&D	   capability	   suite,	   or	   “warehouse”,	   that	   supports	   the	   spectrum	  of	   future	  Agency	   exploration	  
missions.	   The	   Agency	   should	   coordinate	   and	   integrate	   all	   ongoing	   and	   future	   technology	   and	   development	  
Programs,	  including	  investing	  additional	  (minimal)	  resources	  and	  levying	  additional	  strategic	  AR&D	  requirements	  
on	  current	  Programs,	  as	  necessary,	  such	  that	  current	  Programs	  are	  fully	  integrated	  into	  this	  Agency	  strategy.	  The	  
CoP	  believes	  that	  with	  this	  approach,	  a	  U.S.	  mainstream	  AR&D	  technology	  base	  for	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  missions	  
can	  be	  developed	  that	  is	  ready-­‐to-­‐fly,	  low-­‐risk,	  reliable,	  versatile,	  architecture	  and	  destination	  independent,	  and	  
extremely	   cost-­‐effective,	   perhaps	   reducing	  AR&D	   implementation	   costs	   from	   roughly	  $70M	  per	  mission	   to	   as	  
low	  as	  $7M	  per	  mission.	  This	  capability	  would	  enable	  the	  future	  missions	  of	  the	  Science,	  Space	  Operations,	  and	  
Exploration	   Systems	  Mission	  Directorates,	  would	  benefit	   the	  DoD	  and	   the	   commercial	   spaceflight	   sector,	   and	  
would	  re-­‐establish	  U.S.	  leadership	  in	  the	  AR&D	  community.	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Appendix	  A	  -­‐	  Business	  Case	  for	  a	  Campaign	  of	  NASA	  AR&D	  Development	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1.0  Introduction 
 
Consideration of all of NASA’s development efforts and mission needs indicates that an Agency level approach to AR&D 
capability is warranted. This paper considers the benefit of coordinating Orion Project Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, 
and Docking (RPOD) development and Flagship Technology Demonstration (FTD) Program development to meet the needs 
of ISS logistics missions, SMD large scale science missions, and ESMD human exploration missions to yet-to-be-defined 
Beyond Earth Orbit (BEO) destinations. Thus, an “AR&D Development Program” is proposed. 
 
The Orion Project is pursuing RPOD to provide ISS transportation and crew return and as an enabling method for assembly 
with planetary transportation systems. In parallel, NASA is developing plans for a Flagship Technology Demonstration 
(FTD) Program of missions [1] intended to raise the TRL and operational availability of a number of key technologies such 
as: 
• Automated/autonomous rendezvous and docking 
• Advanced Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) 
• Lightweight/Inflatable Modules 
• Aerocapture, and/or entry, descent and landing (EDL) technology 
• Closed-loop life support system demonstration at the ISS 
• In-Orbit Propellant Transfer and Storage 
 
The FTD Point-of-Departure (POD) plan is to execute 4 missions in the next 5 years with primary mission objectives to 
advance inflatables, in-space propellant depots, SEP, and aerocapture as illustrated in Table 1. This proposal uses the FTD 
Program as a framework to show how a campaign of AR&D development could be implemented for cost reduction and 
improved readiness. However, the FTD Program could be replaced by any coordinated series of missions with development 
allocations for supporting AR&D development. 
 
Table 1: FTD Point-of-Departure Flight Manifest 
 
 
Note that three of these missions contain AR&D components. The FTD POD philosophy was to integrate AR&D maturity 
throughout multiple missions to achieve maturity and reliability rather than target a single ”AR&D” demonstration flight. 
This maturation approach is illustrated in Figure 1 where the key AR&D component technologies of mission management 
software, relative navigation sensors, GN&C algorithms, and docking mechanisms are specifically highlighted for each 
mission. 
 
The following sections include, in addition to the Orion and FTD considerations, an examination of the recurring cost of 
deploying the resultant NASA AR&D technology base for missions such as node delivery to ISS and large-scale science 
mission assembly as part of an integrated approach. 
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Figure 1: Flagship Technology Demonstration Program Point-of-Departure Mission Campaign 
 
2.0 Cost Models 
 
This section contains the general costing assumptions that were used to initialize a mission-by-mission cost estimate. Each 
subsection contains information that is used in the more refined analysis to follow unless specifically noted otherwise. 
 
2.1 Cost Assumptions 
 
The following assumptions were made to formulate the cost models: 
1. AR&D is considered a capability needed to meet each mission’s requirements. Therefore, launch costs and main 
spacecraft bus costs are not considered as part of the cost of AR&D development. 
2. Each AR&D mission will have its own core GN&C providing flight control, absolute navigation, and standard 
processing capability. 
3. The AR&D integration with any mission will leverage off of the avionics test facilities for the mission it is developed 
under and will not require dedicated, unique lab support after NRE investments. 
4. Each vehicle will require at least one Orion Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS), one radio-frequency ranging (RFR) 
device, and a natural feature image recognition (NFIR) camera/processor/software module. 
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5. The cost of an engineering unit is 80% of a flight unit. 
6. The cost of a qualification unit is 110% of a flight unit to account for spare parts and breakage. 
7. ISS RPOD is generally more demanding than other missions in terms of program integration, performance 
requirements, and verification. 
8. Cost data was not available for docking mechanism Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) and Recurring Engineering 
(RE) costs and is not included in this treatment. 
2.2 Base AR&D Sensor Cost Model 
 
If it is assumed that the Orion Project did not continue past FY10 in terms of development of the VNS and that any RFR and 
NFIR capability would have to be borne as part of the AR&D Development Program then the cost to develop a first vehicle 
flight sensor suite is presented in Table 2. This cost model additionally assumes that the first production of sensors will 
require a moderate spare policy of 2 engineering units, 1 qualification unit, and 2 flight units for a single string early 
capability. The NRE in this approach is roughly $17,500k with $7,000k of that attributed to completing the Orion VNS NRE 
(some of which includes the conversion from 28V to 100V power supply currently under consideration in Orion). 
 
Table 2: AR&D Base Sensor Cost Assumptions 
 
 
2.3 Personnel Cost Model 
 
Personnel costs are estimated according to the labor required to complete the AR&D component of the FTD POD missions. 
The labor estimate for AR&D specific, non-sensor procurement elements is provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: AR&D Personnel Resource Estimate for FTD POD Campaign (in FTE & WYEs) 
 
 
NASA JSC Aeroscience and Flight Mechanics 
Business Case for a Campaign of NASA AR&D Develop-
ment 
Document No.: EG-DIV-10-22 Draft 
Effective Date: June 15, 2010 Page 4 
 
	  
The assumed rate of this labor is $250k per year and no distinction is made between civil servant and contractor labor. 
Table 4: AR&D Personnel Costs for FTD POD Campaign in $k 
 
 
3.0 Cost for AR&D through a Multi-Mission Campaign 
 
The detailed cost estimate was developed by beginning with the information from the previous section and then assembling a 
campaign of combined FTD, ISS servicing, and post-FTD science missions to evaluate how re-use of spares, utilization of 
expertise, and estimated cost reduction of hardware through a steady supply chain might impact both the overall program cost 
and the eventual steady-state cost of adding AR&D functionality to both robotic and crewed vehicles. Table 5 lists a 
campaign of 6 missions beginning with a single string (for relative navigation sensors that indicates one VNS, one RFR, and 
one NFIR system on the flight vehicle) used to drive out the bulk of the required NRE. Following that, additional missions of 
the same class, an initial ISS mission, recurring ISS mission, and a projected enhanced mission are each explored for cost 
effectiveness. 
 
Table 5: Cost Development Mission Campaign 
 
 
3.1 Mission 1: First Single String AR&D + NRE 
 
The first mission is assumed to be a science or demonstrator mission with an AR&D maturation component. For example, the 
AR&D activities could be carried out as a secondary objective of the FTD-1 SEP mission. As the first in the development 
campaign for AR&D, this mission carries the primary NRE cost for the base AR&D software development (GN&C and 
Mission Manager), FSW implementation, testing, integration, and programmatic support. 
 
Mission 1 also makes the assumptions summarized in Table 6. The reserve is set at 30% to capture the uncertainty and 
unknowns that always accompany a first integration effort. Similarly, a 130% multiplier is applied to the sensor procurements 
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to reflect supply chain and hardware integration anomalies. Note that the reserve is conservatively taken with respect to the 
inflated sensor cost multiplier. The total estimate for this mission is $66,000k of which approximately $35,000k is 
procurement of sensors to establish flight units for this mission and spares for use in the subsequent missions. Details of the 
Mission 1 cost estimate are provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 6: Mission 1 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
 
Table 7: Mission 1: Single String, Single Mission + NRE (Cost in $k) 
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3.2 Mission 2: Additional Dual String AR&D 
 
Mission 2 models the cost of a follow-on science or demonstrator mission, again with AR&D as a secondary objective. For 
example, the AR&D capability could be included as part of FTD-2 Advanced Prop Storage/Transfer. Several key 
assumptions are summarized in Table 8 that modify the cost of mission 2. The reserve is reduced to 15% to reflect maturity 
from the system integration in mission 1 and a modest economy of scale is assumed in the sensor procurement as the 
numbers of sensors purchased begin to reflect the fact that production lines are now in place. No EDUs are purchased for this 
flight as those from mission 1 are re-used. Two flight units are included for sensors to reflect a dual-string reliability 
approach in the maturing system. No NRE is assumed in this mission as a large investment in the overall AR&D approach 
was made in mission 1. 
 
The immediate benefits of a development program as opposed to disconnected mission execution are evident in the total cost 
of AR&D for this dual string mission being $50,000k less than the single string precursor with a total estimated cost of 
$15,000k of which the majority is used for 3 flight quality sensors ($7,000k out of the total $9,500k sensor budget). The labor 
cost is reduced considerably to reflect the fact that the base AR&D software and integration costs were paid in the previous 
mission. 
 
 
Table 8: Mission 2 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
Table 9: Mission 2: Additional Mission, Single String, No NRE (Cost in $k) 
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3.3 Mission 3: First Mission to ISS, After Mission 2 
 
Mission 3 is costed as an AR&D system on a robotic ISS servicing/delivery mission. This could perhaps be FTD-3 Inflatable 
Habitation module delivery to ISS. The mission specific assumptions are listed in Table 10. The mission reserve and sensor 
cost scales are slightly higher than in mission 2 in order to represent that the sophistication of the ISS delivery mission and a 
potentially earlier procurement date than in mission 2 are likely. However, no spare flight units are purchased as they are 
assumed available from the spares of either mission 1 or 2. 
 
No NRE is assumed for this mission, but the labor is significantly higher than in Mission 2 to account for the fact that 
integration with the ISS Program and satisfaction of human spaceflight rigor must be addressed in this mission. Leveraging 
off of the investments in the first two missions, the total AR&D cost (detailed in Table 11) for the first mission to ISS is 
reduced to approximately $20,000k of which $11,000k is sensor hardware. Again, the advantages of a development program 
are apparent in the fact that the significantly more complex ISS AR&D mission is executed for only $4,000k more than its 
preceding robotic mission 2. 
 
 
Table 10: Mission 3 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
Table 11: Mission 3: First Mission to ISS (Cost in $k) 
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3.4 Mission 4: Recurring Single String AR&D 
 
Mission 4 returns to the programmatic roots of mission 1 by supposing an AR&D system is needed for a class B or C robotic 
mission where single string sensor functionality would be acceptable. Specific assumptions are listed in Table 12 where the 
reserve and sensor cost scales have both been modified to represent the maturity in the integrated AR&D system, the 
supporting personnel, and the efficiencies of a now steady production line of sensor hardware. The net result is that the 
mission cost estimate in Table 13 is $6,600k of which nearly two thirds are sensor hardware cost. This may be assumed to be 
the steady state single string AR&D system cost. The comparable dual string system would merely add the cost of a flight 
sensor (one of each type) for an additional $2,610k (a total cost of $9,200k for a dual string system). 
 
 
Table 12: Mission 4 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
Table 13: Mission 4: Recurring Mission, Single String, No NRE (Cost in $k) 
 
 
3.5 Mission 5: Recurring Single String AR&D, Limited Mission Specific NRE 
 
Mission 5 represents a scenario where a new set of requirements emerge that necessitate mission specific NRE to be invested 
in sensors and personnel. For example, the design for missions 1-4 may have been capable for LEO and lunar missions but 
perhaps mission 5 adds the demands of a Jovian sample return where extended ranges of operation or environmental 
shielding must be added to the sensor hardware and new trajectory techniques must be developed for the GN&C software. 
The assumptions for this mission are listed in Table 14 where it can be seen that the reserve is still low to capture the overall 
maturity of the integrated AR&D system with 4 missions to its credit but the sensor cost scale has been increased to reflect 
the fact that these sensors are a modification from the supply line used previously. Similarly, new EDUs and flight spares are 
needed for the relative navigation sensors as the existing stockpile might not be applicable to this mission. 
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The effect of not leveraging off of previous hardware purchases in the development and spare strategy is readily seen in the 
increased sensor and total cost of $29,000k provided in Table 15. Note that $10,000k was assumed to be mission specific 
NRE which indicates that approximately $12,000k of the total cost is the impact of not using the existing stockpile of 
equipment, supporting additional personnel, and including additional lab equipment. 
 
 
Table 14: Mission 5 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
Table 15: Mission 5: Recurring Mission, Single String, Limited Mission Specific NRE (Cost in $k) 
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3.6 Mission 6: Recurring Mission to ISS, After Mission 3 
 
Mission 6 revisits the ISS delivery mission but evaluates the impact of having already executed mission 3 and taking 
advantage of established interfaces, lessons learned, and hardware stockpiles. The assumptions in Table 16 capture the 
specific assumptions for this mission. The total cost estimate of $8,400k outlined in Table 17 realizes a cost reduction of 
$11,000k million from mission 3 and can be assumed to be a conservative mission-to-mission bound for the cost of a proven, 
dual-string AR&D capability for vehicles visiting ISS. 
 
Table 16: Mission 6 Specific Assumptions 
 
 
 
Table 17: Mission 6: Recurring ISS Mission, No NRE (Cost in $k) 
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4.0 Conclusion 
 
The primary purpose of the proposed AR&D Development Program was to highlight the benefits of a coordinated, multi-
mission approach to realizing a robust and reliable AR&D capability. The notional mission timeline and budget expenditures 
have been summarized in Table 18 to give a sample of what the 8 year financial commitment would be from the Agency. The 
development program would peak in years 3 and 4, as for a brief time 5 of the 6 missions would be in various phases of 
development. After year 4, the steady state commitment would be less than $10,000k a year to finish the AR&D component 
of the final 3 missions. The overall program cost would be approximately $142,000k including reserves for an average 
AR&D cost of $23,600k per mission. 
 
A comparison of missions 4 and 1 (single string) and missions 6 and 3 (ISS) illustrate that the impact of a continuous, 
Agency-wide, multi-mission AR&D development program can save between $10,000k and $50,000k per mission by 
leveraging off of mature integrated systems (less reserve needed), a steady production line of standard hardware (reduced per 
unit costs), and commonality with previous missions (parts stockpiles and a knowledgeable development team). The 
execution of a program of this scope and focus would potentially reduce the single mission cost of employing a mature and 
reliable AR&D system to be between $6,000k and $9,000k per mission depending on destination and required redundancy 
(main impact realized through redundant sensor hardware procurement). 
 
Table 18: Cost Model Program Cost (in $k) 
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1.0 Case Studies of Steady-State AR&D Costs Per Vehicle 
 
Three mission classes are considered to contrast the potential benefits of an integrated Agency strategy for AR&D 
development against single-point, project unique designs: 
• LEO to non-ISS (e.g. satellite servicing, on-orbit assembly)  
• LEO to ISS (dual string, human rated) 
• Beyond LEO 
 
1.1 LEO to non-ISS (e.g. satellite servicing, on-orbit assembly) 
 
Following the assumptions in Crain [1], the cost of developing and deploying the AR&D system for a single string single 
mission with a 4 year development cycle is estimated as $65,610k. For a single mission such as this it is assumed that there is 
no supply chain so all sensors and algorithms bear the burden of NRE ($17,500k), cost risk ($15,141), qualification units 
($3,100k), and flight spares ($3,900k). The total cost of these assumptions is approximately $40,000 or two thirds of the total 
AR&D cost. Additionally, there is an assumed $13,250 in labor costs associated with not only the systems engineering of 
integrating AR&D capability into the host vehicle, but also with vetting a one-off system. See Section 2 and Subsection 3.1 
in Crain [1] for the details on these costs. 
 
By comparison, if the NRE is retired, supply chain sensors are available with spares from previous flights, algorithms from 
previous flights are used, and portions of the AR&D system are already vetted then the steady state per mission cost reduces 
to $6,626 for the same mission and the development time is reduced to 2 years per Subsection 3.1 in Crain [1]. 
 
1.2 LEO to ISS (dual string, human rated) 
 
A similar comparison to a mission to ISS must be more carefully calculated because the campaign approach in Crain [1] 
assumes leveraging off of a single string non-ISS mission as above and an intermediate dual-string non- ISS mission. Again, 
if the ISS AR&D system is developed independent of supply chain benefits or previous mission parts, experience, and 
infrastructure then a significant risk, NRE, and first-time integration testing burden must be born by the project. A 
conservative list of assumptions for such a mission is provided in Table 1 with a resulting cost roll-up projection in Table 2. 
The total under this assumption set is a staggering $83,369k for a single mission. Note this cost does not assume that a 
previous space demonstration of components has been flown. If not, then the cost is probably optimistic. If so, then the cost 
risk may be reduced for the sensors only as the system integration challenges are still present. 
 
However, if investments were made in two previous missions where the NRE and risk are retired, some flight spares are 
available in stockpile, and a supply chain cost benefit is assumed then the first mission may require as little as $20,000k for 
AR&D capability (see Crain [1] Subsection 3.3) for the occasional mission and $8,408k for recurring, multiple flights per 
year missions (see Crain [1] Subsection 3.6). Additionally, if a subsequent BEO mission were flown with similar capabilities, 
the NRE and spares stockpile reductions could see the campaign development approach steady- state costs for AR&D 
development on such a mission reduced to as low as $10,000k. 
 
Table 1: First Mission to ISS (one-off approach) Assumptions 
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Table 2: First Mission to ISS (one-off approach) 
 
 
1.3 Beyond LEO 
 
This mission is effectively similar to the single string AR&D mission above but with more stringent sensor perfor- mance 
and risk tolerance assumptions. A modification of the cost values in Crain [1] lead to a single-mission assumed cost of 
$56,169k for AR&D capability as illustrated in Table 3. By comparison, if this mission were conducted after a campaign of 
LEO single string and ISS missions then the steady state cost of such a mission could be as little as $28,821k. That’s a 
significant reduction in cost (50%) but not as great as in the two case studies above. One might wonder why less benefit is 
realized in this case. The answer is that the BEO mission in the campaign development approach still assumed that a new 
sensor performance metric was required above and beyond that demonstrated in previous LEO missions. Therefore, NRE was 
required and flight spares needed for the new sensor capabilities even though the software and techniques of much of the 
AR&D capability had previously been vetted in the development campaign (see Crain [1] Subsection 3.5). 
 
Table 3: Mission 5: BEO Mission with Full AR&D NRE Burden 
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2.0 Additional Insight Gained Since 2010  
 
2.1 Practical Experience Informing the AR&D Development Campaign Approach 
 
The original business case memorandum assumed that NRE, infrastructure, and risk-reduction could be reduced strategically 
by coordinating AR&D and AR&D benefitting technology deployments and establishing a supply chain infrastructure. The 
author is personally aware that claims of high re-use are often overstated at worst or can prove elusive. However, the recent 
efforts by the Morpheus Project [2] and a technology risk reduction undertaken by the SAFARE proposal team [3] have 
reinforced that such benefits are very much realizable. 
 
The Morpheus Project indicated that by leveraging the Core Flight Software (CFS) suite from Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC), the Integrated Test and Integration System (ITOS), and the Trick Simulation environment that approximately 88% 
of a total of 952 KSLOC of flight, ground, and simulation/analysis software was re-used. Additionally, the team went from 
no software base to real-time field tested flight software in 14 months. 
 
The SAFARE risk reduction effort continued the experiment into re-use and took the Morpheus beginning with CFS and 
managed to port the Cygnus COTS AR&D GN&C software into the CFS framework with complete simulation support in 
less than three months and for a total cost of approximately 1 EP. 
 
The effect of these practical lessons learned is that AR&D software maturity and re-use, benefit from previous system 
vetting, and rapid development are realizable goals of the campaign development approach. It is possible that the suggested 
benefits in [1] may prove to be conservative if such a leveraging approach were applied to AR&D in flight development as 
well.  
 
2.2 Considerations for Trading Re-use Benefits Versus Restrictions 
 
The concept of building iteratively upon vetted AR&D capability and establishing sensor supply chains has many obvious 
benefits, but one must also consider the potential downsides to such an approach. After all, if a project is gaining from the 
NRE and experience of previous missions it is also restricted to use those technologies and techniques at the potential 
expense of newer and more innovative techniques. This subsection seeks to itemize and expand on some themes exploring 
the trade-offs between complete project flexibility and adherence to an AR&D capability warehouse approach that have 
emerged in discussions of the NASA AR&D Community of Practice. 
 
2.2.1 Relative Navigation Sensors and Integrated Communications 
 
Advantages of AR&D Development Campaign: 
• NRE for multiple projects can be retired early  
• Supply chain approach greatly reduces cost and risk over boutique ”one-off” sensor designs  
• Flight heritage provides maturity and confidence in components  
• Leveraging off of EDU and lab test infrastructure is possible at low to no cost 
 
Restrictions of AR&D Development Campaign: 
• Early projects may have to buy more capability than they need if the sensors for the development campaign are more 
capable than a specific mission requires. 
• New projects (such as the BEO AR&D) may have to invest additional NRE to push the performance envelope beyond 
that of previous missions. 
 
2.2.2 Robust AR&D GN&C & Real-Time Flight Software (FSW) 
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Advantages of AR&D Development Campaign:  
• Software re-use can greatly reduce development and test time as demonstrated by [2] and [3]. 
 
Restrictions of AR&D Development Campaign: 
• Some in-house software establishments may be resistant to adopting and/or sharing software in an “open-source” 
fashion within the NASA community. 
• Projects will have to abide by some common interface and test standards to keep the FSW suite operational with the 
addition of new mission capabilities. 
 
2.2.3 Docking/Capture Mechanisms 
 
Advantages of AR&D Development Campaign:  
• Of all the systems, this makes the most sense for commonality because it is a hardware interface.  
• If new classes of mechanisms are required they can be added to the warehouse of AR&D capability. 
 
Restrictions of AR&D Development Campaign:  
• If a new class of mechanism (i.e. small sample return) is required then NRE will have to be expended.  
• Some interface and test standards will be levied on each project. 
 
2.2.4 Mission/System Managers for Autonomy/Automation 
 
Advantages of AR&D Development Campaign: 
• Autonomous system software needs re-use and shelf-life to wring out flaws, this is provided by the campaign approach 
• Missions outside of the AR&D domain can benefit/contribute to this capability. For example, scheduling events during 
an automated EDL sequence could be done by software very similar to the software that automates AR&D. 
 
Restrictions of AR&D Development Campaign: 
• If a new class of mechanism (i.e. small sample return) is required then NRE will have to be expended.  
• Some interface and test standards will be levied on each project. 
 
A common concern is also missing innovative new approaches in these areas by abiding by the vetted capabilities in the 
AR&D warehouse. However, this is a concern that all projects and programs must face as they evaluate the merits of using 
existing technologies versus seeking out new approaches to meeting their requirements. The AR&D development campaign 
effort will require some care and feeding therefore to on-ramp new approaches and sunset obsolescent technologies as 
appropriate to keep the operational, vetted, and rapidly deployable AR&D capability suite continually up to date. 
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